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Re-inventing Music Distribution
Bharat Rao, Mihir Parikh and Ziv Navoth
Institute for Technology & Enterprise, Polytechnic University. http://www.ite.poly.edu
Abstract
The music industry is in the throes of a
revolution, due to the proliferation of new compression
technologies and the widespread availability of both
original and pirated content on the Internet. This article
describes the current developments affecting this industry
and posits that major players in this domain need to re-
invent their business models in order to embrace and
extend this revolution. By moving toward a commonly
available audio file formats such as MP3, and supporting
technological solutions for copy protection and digital
watermarking, record labels need to capture the
distribution efficiencies and customer value that can be
realized by moving to the online model.
The Digital Distribution Revolution
In early 1999, several threats looked significant
enough to undermine the very foundations of the industry,
and the way business was done. Firstly, consumers
increasingly purchased their music online, through online
retailers like Amazon.com, CDnow, etc., and this had led
to increased price competition and increased customer
acquisition costs for the traditional retailers. Many
traditional retailers had to rethink their revenue model
either due to the advent of pure online retailers or their
own migration to the hybrid physical-online model (Rao,
1998). Secondly, in addition to the gradual drift towards
online retailing, the Internet had also brought a more
immediate and equally serious threat: the online (and in a
majority of cases, illegal) distribution of music through
various compressed audio formats, had clearly sent panic
signals across the industry. Streaming audio and
compression technologies had made spectacular progress
since their inception in late 1995 and early 1996. The
earliest signs that near CD-quality music could be
transmitted on the Internet came with the release of Real
Network's RealAudio 5.0, by which files could be stored
and streamed relatively efficiently over a 28.8K modem.
But this was just a hint of the developments to follow. In
a few months, another spectacularly successful format had
emerged, the MP3 format. Under this format, files were
compressed in compliance with the standards established
by the Moving Picture Experts Group. Established in
January 1998 by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), MPEG had grown to include some
350 experts, hailing from academia and 200 companies
and organizations around the world. The MP3 format
allowed for an almost tenfold reduction in file size from
previous methods of compression, without a discernible
loss in quality. The acceptance of MP3, and the
proliferation of ripper-programs that enabled audiophiles
to copy tracks from CD-ROMs and post them online, had
turned the online digital music trickle into a flood. In late
1998, the MP3 phenomenon had gone "mainstream" on
the Internet, when the Internet portal Lycos.com began to
offer a unique MP3 search engine. The bulk of traffic in
MP3's was clearly illegal and violated copyright.
However, MP3 had proliferated virus-like in a networked
environment, where legislation and policing of any kind
were neither forthcoming nor made sense and was almost
impossible to implement. MP3 also gained widespread
attention when Michael Robertson, a pioneer and
evangelist of the format, established a web-site dedicated
to resources for MP3 buffs. Around 500,000 music files
available for free download on the Internet by February
1998.
The online medium was beginning to alter the
way musical content was created, promoted and
eventually distributed. A number of bands had gravitated
toward the MP3 format, creating and promoting new
singles online, due to cost and reach considerations. Some
bands like Widespread Panic complemented this type of
promotion with online marketing efforts, often aided by a
loyal group of fans (WSJ, 1999). It was likely that small
to medium sized bands could easily migrate to the online
distribution format, in order to attract and gain an initial
audience, and ultimately build their identity. The arrival
of a secure standard for distribution would be vital to
legitimizing their efforts and enabling them to earn both
recognition and financial rewards for their creative
efforts. Insofar as final distribution was concerned, the
trend was towards the ubiquitous availability of music.
Rio, a portable MP3 player that retailed for $199, would
enable users to download their own compilations as and
when they required. The "empeg-car" player was geared
toward the car user. A future version promised the ready
availability of 500 albums (or over 7000 singles) for the
road at CD quality.
Reacting to Change
The music industry had been scrambling to react
to the far-reaching effects of this revolution. In early
1999, IBM had developed a new compression technology
that would compete with MP3. IBM had launched the
Electronic Music Management System (EMMS) would
enable entire albums to be distributed online. This had
110
been developed in collaboration with Warner Music,
Universal, EMI, Sony and BMG (the Madison Project).
However, it would be a matter of time before the success
of this initiative can be assessed. IBM had already
indicated that this format would not be compatible with
current MP3 devices like the Rio, for security purposes,
which made the acceptance of this format extremely
unattractive to existing MP3 consumers. One of the
assumptions of this plan was that the delivery of music
would increasingly move to broadband. At the end of
1998, broadband technologies penetrated around 310,000
households in the US, or 1.3% of on-line households. It
was projected that this figure would swell to 30% of on-
line households by 2002 (Forrester Research, 1998, a). It
was likely that this assumption would be tested by time
and infrastructural hurdles to rolling out broadband
technology across a broad spectrum of the market. The
other assumption was that the security of this method of
digital delivery would be foolproof. This was yet to be
tested as EMMS was still in a developmental phase. Also,
any method that relied purely on software encryption was
vulnerable to future break-ins. The Recording Industry
Association of America (RIIA) was vehemently fighting
the illegal use of MP3 for music distribution. The RIAA
had launched Secure Digital Music Initiative in December
1998, with a view to developing a secure audio format
that would prevent illegal copying. The success of this
project was questioned by industry analysts, given the
proliferation of formats like MP3 and the difficulties in
enforcement.
Other competing formats that had emerged on
the horizon were Liquid Audio and AT&T's a2b platform.
The Liquid Audio format offered even better technical
quality than MP3, and perhaps the best possible copyright
protection for publishers and artists. This technology
allowed the downloading of singles for a set price (around
99 cents per track), but these could not be copied
elsewhere once downloaded to the user's computer.
Although the tracks could be written onto a CD-ROM,
they also carried an identifier (the Liquid Passport), which
carried the customer's credit card number. Even if a
customer passed on the CD to a friend, the track couldn't
be decoded without the original Passport. A detriment to
copying was thus built in into the Liquid Audio
technology. Although this technology offered the
necessary copyright protection, it was unclear if the
recording industry would embrace such a format. The
reason for this was very simple: it made little sense to
charge $6 for a new CD with 10-12 tracks online, when
the same CD was being sold in stores at anywhere from
$12-$20. Clearly, there was a conflict of interest in
parallel channels of distribution, and this did not bode
well for the future. However, industry observers predicted
that digital downloads of music would account for around
3% to 5% of music retailing revenues by 2002 mainly due
to bandwidth limitations and portability issues.
Changing Industry Structure
Figure 1 shows the current structure of the music
industry where marketing and distribution of music is
carried out through several channels in three categories:
Music distribution, information dissemination and
branding/community building. The major channels for
music distribution are retailers (Virgin, Borders, etc.),
distributors (BMG, Columbia House, etc.), and private
and public shows. The major channels for information
dissemination are professional promoters, disk jockeys,
dance clubs, television and radio stations. They propagate
information about new releases and provide samples of
music to the music lovers and potential customers. They
also help create brands and develop communities of music
fans with similar tastes. Another major channel for
branding is retailers, who in addition to selling music, are
vital to promotional and associated merchandise sales.
This structure of the industry is relatively inefficient, as
there are three groups of intermediaries between artists
and customers. Each intermediary adds a layer of cost and
profit leading to higher final cost. This provides
opportunities to new players who can potentially reduce
the final cost by bypassing an existing intermediary. The
success of BMG (Bertlesmann) and Columbia House
(Sony) in direct selling the music at a lower cost has
proven this to some extent.
Under the current structure, the most dominating
force in the industry are the labels or producers. They
command significant control by controlling most of the
major marketing and distribution channels and binding
artists to long-term contracts. Having very limited access
to marketing and distribution channels, most emerging
artists cannot compete on their own. They either end up
joining a label or remain small in a niche market. This
invariably allows labels to walk away with the lion’s
share of profit.
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Figure 1: The Current Industry Structure
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The emergence of the Internet and development
of compression and streaming technologies for audio
storage and distribution provide opportunities for radical
changes in the industry structure. The first wave of the
change came at the lower level of music distribution.
Several on-line retailers (Music Boulevard, CDNow,
Amazon.Com, etc.) popped up to sell CDs and
audiocassettes through the Internet. This eliminated the
costs of carrying inventory, keeping sales staff and
developing physical outlets leading to lower final costs
and reduced prices. Although this did not change the
overall structure of the industry, it certainly changed the
buyer behavior. The customers, who used to go to
physical stores to purchase music, started sampling and
buying music (still in the old media—CDs and cassettes)
through the on-line retailers.
The second wave of change, which is beginning
to happen right now, may fundamentally change the
structure of the industry. New digital audio formats (MP3,
RealAudio, LiquidAudio, a2b, etc.) make music
downloadable directly through the Internet. The
customers, who bought CDs and cassettes over the
Internet, can now download music and store it on the hard
disks of their computers or on their portable players. They
can also create customized CDs with CD writers. In the
long run, this may even altogether eliminate old
containers of music—CDs and cassettes. Music in the
future will be carried on portable equipment such as Rio
or Empeg-Car.
This provides new opportunities to emerging
artists to independently promote and distribute their music
through the Internet without the support and clout of
labels. The primary channel to market and distribute
music becomes the Internet. This shifts the power
structure in the industry from labels to artists. However,
not all artists will have skills and interests in marketing
and distributing music. This will lead to an emergence of
new intermediaries, which we call—Internet music
portals (Lycos and MP3.com are primitive examples)
(Figure 2). These intermediaries will evolve to play a
combine role of labels, distributors and retailers. Thus,
reduce the inefficiencies in the current industry structure
and tremendously lower the final cost.
This evolving industry structure would lead to
new forms of disintermediation and reintermediation.
Unfortunately, for labels, these changes cannot be stopped
or reversed. If labels act smart and move swiftly they can
easily transform themselves into the new intermediaries
and still be able to survive in the long run. However, a
factor that works against labels is the speed at which these
changes are happening. The speed enforces labels to
immediately dismantle their current supply chains, which
they are reluctant to do. We have seen this behavior also
in other industries, for example, PCs (Compaq vs. Dell)
and books (Amazon.com vs. Borders). Today, labels have
immense clout over the industry, but any further delay in
changing their business models will lead to the rise and
strengthening of competitive forces, which will dominate
the industry by being there first as the new intermediaries.
The future flag-bearers of this industry will deliver a
creative combination of music, content, community and
custom marketing, that enhances all aspects of the
customers music consumption experience.
Other Implications
The booming music industry, that relied
extensively on a physical distribution network until the
recent past, had been profoundly affected by the
connectivity and efficiencies offered by the Internet.
Further, radical changes in audio compression and
distribution (especially the MP3 phenomenon) had also
led to the flaunting of copyright laws, and threatened the
core of the leading industry players' business and revenue
models. In order to compete effectively in this radically
altered landscape, the big players needed to come up with
suitable standards (or embrace an existing and popular
standard like MP3), and enforce practical legislation.
They needed to support and promote technological
solutions for copy protection and digital watermarking.
In addition, they needed to use the Internet and digitally
distributed music content to educate consumers, create
and reinforce brand awareness and recognition, promoting
music events, and establish communities of interest.
These revolutionary changes are not limited to
just the music industry. The entire entertainment industry
will have to wake up to the new opportunities and
challenges posed by new technologies like digital
production, storage and distribution, broadband, and the
move towards networked appliances.
Please contact authors for references.
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Figure 2: The Emerging Structure
